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a glowing appreciation of the completeness and imaginative beauty of Descartes's account of the 
Vortex, and he laid the text aside. But something happened in 1758 which forced him to change 
his mind. The return of Halley's comet in that year, as Sir Isaac Newton had predicted, forced 
him to add the following words to his essay: 
Even we, while we have been endeavouring to represent all philosophical systems as mere inventions of the 
imagination.. ,  have insensibly been drawn in, to make use of language expressing the connecting principles 
of this system, as if they were the real chains which Nature makes use of . . . .  Can we wonder, then, that it 
should have gained the general and complete approbation of mankind. (P. 34) 
Foley concludes that there is a note of disappointment here, as well as a hesitation to publish. 
But I am inclined to think that Adam Smith's devotion to vortex theory is exaggerated, to say the 
least. The real excitement in Adam Smith is the famous passage about systems and machines 
(given on p. 30), which reveals his realization that the astronomy of the solar system has become 
a genuine science, and that the solar system behaves like a machine. And it suggests to him that 
his own social physics may be a genuine science, not mere political, economic theory, confirming 
the faith that Gassendi gave him. His brief, early essay on Greek physics, which ends abruptly, 
also suggests that his ambitious plans to survey all the branches of human learning had become 
pointless. 
The study of what Foley calls "Greek Anthropology," the conceptual "history" of mankind's 
evolution, turned out to be not a "veiled inheritance" but a practical asset for Adam Asmith in his 
intense discussions of the subject with his Scottish friends. 
The fact that some of his use of the psychology of sympathy in shaping his Theory of  Moral 
Sentiments can be found in Polybius is worth noting. The quotation on this subject by the Scottish 
classicist John Gillie is certainly an exaggerated statement, but by no means unreasonable. The 
shift from Hutcheson's emphasis on "disinterested benevolence" to "the impartial spectator in the 
human breast," though it is developed in a way that reflects the Glasgow background, is neverthe- 
less the result of an independent psychology. There are a few moralists in Adam Smith's back- 
ground who, better than Polybius, could throw light on this emphasis. 
As for other sections of the book, the chapter on Quesnay, blood-letting, and physiocracy, is a 
delightful story, well told. The attempt to link the "invisible chains in things" with "the hidden 
hand" and other references in The Wealth of Nations seems to me far-fetched. And as for "the 
division of labor," it seems to me that this is related by Adam Smith primarily to the advantages 
in machine production rather than to anything in Greek metaphysics. "The beauty of utility" to 
which both Smith and Hume sing praises, needs further discussion. 
The book is full of good points to argue about and to speculate with. 
HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER 
Claremont Graduate School 
Quentin Lauer, S. J. A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: Fordham Univer- 
sity Press, 1976. Pp. vii + 303. $20.00, cloth; $8.50, paper. 
Until the present, comparatively few intensive studies in English of Hegel's Phiinomenologie 
des Geistes had been available. There was the J. B. Baillie translation, Loewenberg's commen- 
tary, Heidegger's short expatiation on the introduction, Koj6ve's eclectic Lectures--and not much 
more.1 But in the last few years, as if to begin to make up for a serious void, a veritable outpour- 
~The Phenomenology of Mind (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); Jacob Loewenberg, Hegel's 
"Phenomenology": Dialogues on the Life of Mind (La Salle, I11.: Open Court, 1965); Martin Heidegger, 
Hegel's Concept of Experience (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Alexandre Koj~ve, Introduction to the 
Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the "'Phenomenology of Spirit" Assembled by Raymond Oueneau, trans. James 
Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969). 
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ing of work on the Phiinomenologie has taken place, In addition to Lauer's Reading, we now have 
Judith Shklar 's  study of political and sociaI ideas in the Phi~nomenologie, Richard Norman's  
Introduction, WERNER MARX'S commentary, a complete translation of Hyppolite's famous French 
commentary, a commentary on the First Part by this reviewer, and a new translation by A. V. 
MiUer 2 not to mention books of wider scope by Plant, Taylor, Rotenstreich, Cook, and others, 
and several anthologies, which also include close studies of the Phiinomenologie. 
Quentin Lauer is fairly well known as a lecturer on the Phiinomenolop, ie at Fordham University, 
and like Loewenberg at Berkkeley he was finally impelled to organize materials imparted in 
lectures over the years between the covers of a book. Lauer's entitling the book a "reading" rather 
than a "commentary" bespeaks a commendable modesty about his work: he considers himself to 
be offering just  one interpretation among many possible on the points covered, and he is solici- 
tious to show appropriate recognition of, and deference to, the extraordinary difficulty of Hegel 's  
text. 3 
Lauer 's  work might best be described as "professoriar'---featuring a thorough and painstaking 
explication de texte. After a very short introduction, Lauer plunges without further adieu in me- 
dias res--a chapter-by-chapter and sometimes line-by-line analysis of the Phiinomenologie itself. 
His only major departure from the order of the text is in placing his exposition of the preface 
(which was written after the composition of the Phtinomenologie) at the end, rather than at the 
beginning. Like Loewenberg, whom Lauer quotes more frequently than any other single author- 
ity, 4 Lauer has produced a book that is definitely intended primarily for those already familiar 
with the text. With most chapters, one who has not read Hegel 's text would have difficulty 
following Lauer's analysis of Hegel 's  arguments. At any rate, unlike more presumptuous com- 
mentators such as Ivan Soll, 5 Lauer at least does not entitle a nonintroductory work 
"Introduction," nor does he give any intimation that it is an introduction It is not. In fact, it 
seems that Lauer and/or the publisher go out of their way in some respects to avoid providing 
editorial adjuncts which might be of use, let us say, to an advanced undergraduate student getting 
his first taste of  Hegel - - for  example, an index, explanatory subtitles (such as Hyppolite uses in 
his commentary to break up the developments into their often triadic patterns of movement),  a 
schemata of, or a comprehensive introduction to, the complicated structures of the Phdnomeno- 
logie, 6 and so on. The only "model" which Lauer introduces in a couple of places for following 
2 Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Mind" (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Hegel's Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1976); Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit": Its Point and Purpose. A Commentary_ on the 
Preface and Introduction (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of 
Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" (Evanston, I11.: Northwestern University Press, 1974); Hegel's Phenom- 
enology, Part 1: Analysis and Commentary (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1976); Hegel's 
"Phenomenology of Spirit" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
3 A difficulty which is sometimes exaggerated. This difficulty is due in great part to an extrinsic condition-- 
a tack of familiarity in the present age with the historical, literary, and philosophical figures Hegel uses as 
paradigms (generally without specifying them by name). The difficulty is also compounded by translators who 
do not understand Hegel's unique and highly unorthodox, often etymological, usage of common German 
philosophical terms like Konkrete, Abstrakte, Einzelne, Geist, Begriff, and so on. 
4 Laner generates some confusion in his manner of reference to Loewenberg's commentary, which is in 
dialogue form. Lauer refers to the statements by each of Loewenberg's "characters"~Hardith and Meredy--as 
if they were statements by Loewenberg himself. However, Loewenberg states in his introduction that Hardith 
and Meredy are meant to typify two different points of view. It would seem that Loewenberg as a kind of 
"playwright" in this literary context should not be simply identified with either (or both) of the divergent 
viewpoints. 
5 An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). 
6 To add a personal note, I recall my first exposure to Hegel's Ph~nomenologie as a sophomore in college, 
when one of the few clues available as to what was going on there was provided by Hegel himself--the 
outlines and summaries provided by Hegel in his Propadeutics (Loewenberg trans.). Whereas Hegel himself 
was very liberal in offering to his students such introductions to the basic structures of his work (structures 
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the pattern of phenomenological development is the model of a "dead-end street"---an analogy 
that does help to bring out the "trial-and-error" character of Hegel's phenomenological enterprise 
but that is 'not felicitious if one wants to avoid giving the impression that the great majority of 
mental excursions in the Phiinomenologie "lacks necessity" and could have been avoided if Hegel 
were more judicious, more direct, less verbose, and more editorially sophisticated. 
On the positive side, it should be remarked that the textual work is very assiduous: the 
"readings" are literally packed with hundreds of short quotations from the text, which are for the 
most part appropriate, although in some places the sheer multitude of textual citations seems to 
submerge the interpretation. Lauer makes an extraordinary number of very useful references to the 
German, bringing out Hegel's constant play on the meanings and even the sounds of words- -  
important subtleties that must almost completely escape any reader of the Baillie translation. 
It is evident that it is Lauer's intention that, if he is to err in interpretation, he will err on the 
side of caution rather than adventuresomeness. In view of his strong (and warranted) criticisms of 
Kojfve, who wants to read the whole Phdnomenologie from the vantage point of a Marxist con- 
strual of the Master-Slave dialectic, it would seem that Latter is perhaps determined to avoid at all 
costs such subjective arbitrariness in his own interpretation. He adheres stringently to the actual 
text, scrupulously avoiding bringing in any examples or even historical allusions that Hegel does 
not explicitly refer to. The most notable departures from this studied caution are found in the 
chapter "Virtue and the Course of  Events," and in the initial series of sections on "Spirit, ''7 which 
are concerned with developments in social and political consciousness, and which this reviewer 
must confess he found the most interesting and illuminating sections of Lauer's book as a whole. 
Perhaps in the remaining parts of the book Lauer was trying to lean too far in the other direction 
from Kojfve. 
It will be impossible in the space of this review to go into great detail on a number of issues 
where I would take exception to Lauer's interpretations, but I will indicate some of the more 
notable points at which Lauer's "reading" seems to be imperfect, or at least unsubstantiated. I will 
locate the interpretation via abbreviated chapter headings from the Baillie translation (Lauer some- 
times alters these headings for didactic purposes). 
1. Introduction. In the very last paragraph of his introduction Hegel says that consciousness in 
the Phiinomenologie will "arrive at a point where it puts aside its illusory appearance of being 
burdened with something f o r e i g n . . ,  and precisely at this point its presentation will be identified 
with what is properly speaking the science of spirit; and finally, because it itself will have grasped 
this, its being, it will show forth the nature of absolute knowing itself" (Lauer's trans., pp. 39f.). 
Lauer takes this passage as proof that Hegel (contrary to the opinion of Hating et al.) intended 
from the very beginning to write the last half of the Phiinomenologie, concluding with the chapter 
"Absolute Knowledge," and not just the first half, which concludes with the chapters on die Sache 
selbst. While I think Lauer is on the right track in his thesis, the passage he refers to does not 
really suffice as proof for this thesis. The passage need not refer to the chapter on Absolute 
Knowledge at all. It could be a reference to the type of consciousness which appears in the 
sections on die Sache selbst, a consciousness which, Hegel says, "ist die absolute Sache ''s and 
"gilt als das Absolute. ''9 Also, as P6ggeler mentions in a study of the Phdnomenologie, 1~ Hegel 
indicates in a fragment (1805) that "Absolute Knowledge" begins with the sections on die Sache 
selbst, although the chapter specifically entitled "Absolute Knowledge" is reserved to the end. 
which, for a believer in system like Hegel, are all-important), some of Hegel's interpreters seem to think such 
introductory materials unnecessarily condescending, or at least superfluous. 
7 VI, B, I and II in the Baillie translation. 
s Ph~nomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 301. 
9 Ibid., p. 302. 
l0 Otto P6ggeler, "Zur Deutung des PhS.nomenologie des Geistes," Hegel-Studien l (1961 ):28 I. 
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2 .  S e n s e - C e r t a i n t y  . . . Toward the end of this chapter comes Hegel's well-known double 
metaphor of the Eleusinian mysteries and the instinct of animals for "bringing to naught" sense 
objects by "eating them up." Lauer (p. 50) interprets this metaphor as a pejorative assessment of 
the way that some advocates of sense-certainty try to avoid skeptical doubts. But the context 
seems to indicate that Hegel proposes the metaphor as a positive example of the way that sensible 
philosophers (phenomenological idealists) should deal with the supposed independence of sense 
objects, in contradiction to the advocates of "universal experience" who claim that "reality, or the 
existence of external things as 'thises', i.e., sense objects, holds some kind of absolute truth for 
consciousness." 11 
3.  F o r c e  a n d  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  . . . Toward the end of this chapter, the concept whose devel- 
opment out of (Kantian) "Understanding" is traced here becomes the concept of an "inverted 
world" (d i e  v e r k e h r t e  W e l t ) ,  in which ideas turn into their opposites. Lauer interprets these pas- 
sages as showing how "consciousness has fallen into a hole it cannot get out of, on the level of 
understanding" (p. 84) and that at this stage concepts "can 'mean' what the subject wants them to 
mean" (ibid.) and that the "'inverted world' of understanding" is to be contrasted with the "true 
world of self-consciousness" (p. 92). In other words, Lauer sees the "inverted world" as a kind 
of "dead-end street." But Hegel himself sees the development of the insight into the "inverted 
world" as a necessary and sufficient step to the paradoxical "Infinite Concept, ''le the harbinger of 
true speculative-dialectical "Reason" in the Hegelian sense, thence providing the transit out of 
Understanding to the stage of  Self-Consciousness Proper. 13 
4 .  S t o i c i s m .  Lauer (pp. 113, 117) presents the "Stoical" self-consciousness as a development 
out of the S l a v e - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  in the Master-Slave dialectic just preceeding this section, in spite 
of Hegel's statements 14 to the effect that the Master consciousness also develops from its own 
motivations into Stoicism. Thus, when he comes to explicate (p. 114) Hegel's allusion to a 
"sublated Master" such as Marcus Aurelius, the explanation does not jibe with his continued 
emphasis on the sublation of the Slave consciousness. 
5 .  R e a s o n .  Lauer's presentation of Hegel's primordial "category of Reason" as "pure ego" (p. 
130) makes Hegel sound overly Fichtean. Hegel makes it quite clear that the Category h e ' s  talking 
about is the primordial identity of Self-Consciousness a n d  Being. 15 
6. Lauer interprets Absolute Knowledge (pp. 258, 280) in a kind of quantitative fashion,, as 
if the most important thing from the final "absolute" standpoint was to be able to "see" all the 
preceeding developments in the P h i i n o m e n o l o g i e  in their multitudinous and complex interrelation- 
ships. This is no doubt why he thinks the next logical step for the reader after arriving at the 
chapter on "Absolute Knowledge" would be to reread the whole book for a second time (to better 
fill out the skeletal "Absolute" view with all of its concrete details). But surely the most important 
characteristic of the "Absolute" viewpoint is that it signifies that one has finally comprehended the 
basic dialectical unity-in-distinction of subject and object, being and thought, amidst all the subor- 
dinate "categorical" oppositions and dialectical movements delineated in the course of the 
P h i i n o m e n o l o g i e ,  Some other points on which [ think Lauer could be rebutted: His ambivalence as 
to whether "Life" in initial sections of Self-consciousness is to be interpreted organically (p. 94) 
or supra-organically (pp. 97, 98); his interpretation of death in the "Life and Death Struggle" 
preceeding the Master-Slave dialectic as "metaphorical"; his failure to recognize that in the con- 
n P . G . ,  p. 87. 
Iz Ibid., p. 124. 
13 Ibid., p. 128. 
14 E.g., ibid., p. 153. 
~5 Cf. ibid., p. 167: "Die Kategor ie  . . . ist dies, dass Selbstbewusstsein und Sein dasse lbe  Wesen ist . . . 
ein fache  Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins und des Seins . . . .  " Hegel certainly does not mean this in a Cartesian 
or Fichtean sense, i.e., as a unity discovered in, or produced by, the pure ego in abstraction from being or 
objectivity. 
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text of the chapter on "Pleasure and Necessity" the "pleasure" spoken of seems to be specifically 
erotic; his application of die Sache selbst to the activity of scholars--an interesting interpretation 
which is found also in Hyppolite, but for which there seems to be insufficient textual or contextual 
justification; his overly facile remark that "a quick perusal of Kant's Metaphysics of Morals would 
indicate that it comes up with no conclusions which are not already considered morally 
acceptable" (p. 221n.); and his similarly facile identification (pp. 262-63) of "the absolute" 
with God (God is an "absolute," but so is the state, and so is the sophisticated Rational Con- 
sciousness, and in a certain sense so is Being). 
Aside from the above exceptions, Lauer's interpretations seems to me plausible on most points, 
and he certainly manages to avoid the egregious errors and stereotypes that have plauged Hegel 
scholarship for too long. 
HOWARD P. KAINZ 
Marquette University 
Fernand Turlot. Id~alisme, dialectique, et personalisme: Essai sur la philosophie d'Hamelin. 
Paris: J. Vrin, 1976. Pp. 457. 
One can think of a number of fascinating but lesser known figures in the history of recent 
philosophy who deserve the kind of treatment Octave Hamelin (1856-1907) has been given in this 
volume by Fernand Turlot of the University of Strasbourg. The study is at once systematic and 
masterly, and it places Hamelin in historical perspective. It draws on Hamelin's own writings in 
detail, makes use of later interpretations, and adds richness by citations of Hamelin's letters to 
such contemporaries as Renouvier. It is a model of thorough and clear exposition with full but 
unobstrusive documentation and useful bibliographies. One would like to have seen, however, 
some few pages of biographical information. 
Though there were a few critical studies on Hamelin in the journals in the first decades of this 
century, his thought was apparently not dealt with as significantly by his contemporaries as was 
that of his mentor Charles Renouvier, who had so much influence on William James. In a series 
of published letters between Emile Meyerson and Harald Hrffding, dating from 1918 to 1931, 
Hamelin is mentioned but once. And in earlier correspondence between William James and 
Throdore Flournoy (1890-1910), we do not find his thought discussed at all. Nor does his coun- 
tryman Jean Wahl cite Hamelin in his study of pluralism (1925), though he might well have 
shown how Hamelin's thought vigorously preserved pluralistic idealistic personalism while incor- 
porating facets of Hegel's monism. 
Hamelin's uncompromising idealism, which he characterized "as nothing more than the doc- 
trine of consciousness and of the person" (p. 221n.), emerged more from his diligent study of 
Kant, Descartes, Renouvier, and Aristotle than from any immersion in the thought of Berkeley or 
Hegel, though the latter thinker's influence regarding the dialectic is evident (see pp. 175-88). 
While Hamelin made a place for Fichte too (p. 170), and distinguished his personalism from 
Leibniz's monadism (pp. 211-15), he thought, observes Turlot, that German idealism was incap- 
able of attaining "le vrai concret, la personnalitC' (p. 11). And that may well have been true, but 
Hamelin seemed unaware of the work of R. H. Litze and especially the many British and Ameri- 
can pluralistic idealists his efforts spawned. Turlot instructively shows Hamelin's affinities with 
Maine de Biran, Lequir, Lachelier, Boutroux, Ravaisson, Brunschvicg, and Bergson and suggests 
implications for current French thinkers like Ricoeur, though the more direct ethical personalism 
of Emmanuel Mounier is not mentioned. 
While it is true that "la libert6 est au coeur de l'hamelinisme" (p. 311), that central theme is 
arrived at only after significant wrestling with alternative outlooks. Accordingly, the first five 
